

reached, unless there has been significant political and economic progress, stability is far from assured.

If the Moslem Croat Federation stays together, the Bosnian Serbs' 2 to 1 disadvantage in arms compared to the Federation could serve as an incentive for them to align more closely with Serbia, to the detriment of the goal of a unified Bosnia.

If, on the other hand, the Federation does not stay together, the Bosnian Moslems will be at a 2 to 1 disadvantage in a potential two-front conflict with the combined strength of the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Serbs.

Now, I would say that it is unlikely that the Bosnian Croats and the Bosnian Serbs will join in some kind of unified or coordinated attack against the Bosnian Muslims, but the Bosnian Muslims could in the future easily find themselves in a conflict with both parties. These fragile assumptions, which could go awry very easily, make it even more essential from my perspective that the goal of the arms control build-down, the first effort to build down the weapons, as well as any arm-and-train program, leave all the parties with primarily a defensive capability.

If we start basically building up offensive arms, these ratios and all the complexities are going to be vast.

In spite of these fragile and questionable assumptions, I believe that a build-down process is worth a try. I believe that we must undertake at least the effort.

Finally, it will be imperative for the United States to remain engaged at the highest diplomatic levels to assure that the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and other civilian organizations utilize the time available to them to undertake an intensive and focused effort to accomplish their task.

F. RISKS TO MILITARY MISSION RELATING TO CIVILIAN TASKS

Mr. President, possibly the greatest risk to the military mission is that there will be confusion of the military mission and the much broader U.S. and international political goals—confusion in the Congress and confusion in the country.

This has two aspects. The first is that there will be mission creep on the ground with the U.S. military being expected to assume more and more responsibility for the political or civilian aspects of the framework agreement. These include the task of continuing humanitarian aid, rehabilitation of infrastructure and economic reconstruction, the return of displaced persons and refugees, the holding of free elections, police functions within borders, and the like.

One of the trickiest areas is not about separating the forces. That is a clear military mission. But what happens within an area if you start having murders take place within the borders? Whose job is it to take on the policing of that? Certainly, the civilian mission will be to do what they can to restore

the function of the police forces, but in the meantime what does the United States military and what do other NATO militaries do when there is really chaos within the borders?

These are a few of the areas that could very easily lead to mission creep.

The second danger—and this is something I think all of us in the Congress have a keen responsibility to keep in mind in our remarks—relates to public perception of how we define the military mission's success or lack thereof. I noted earlier that the military mission is limited. Assuming the United States military leaves Bosnia in approximately 1 year and the conflict there resumes shortly thereafter, has the military mission been a failure under these circumstances? If the news media and the American public confuse our narrowly defined 1-year military mission with the long-term political goals for a united and stable and peaceful Bosnia, the perception of failure after 1 year is possible and perhaps even probable. So I think it is important for us to define these terms very carefully.

V. RESIDUAL FORCE

Since the plans for carrying out the civilian tasks are far behind the military side and since they are so important to the building process, the best case is that there will be a solid beginning toward accomplishing the civilian tasks during the first year of the military deployment. But it will be far from complete. Because of this, I believe that planning must start now for a residual military force to replace the NATO implementation force at the end of a year to give the parties and the organizations helping them the secure environment and confidence they need to continue the longer-term civilian task which without any doubt is going to take far longer than 1 year.

A residual force should not include United States ground forces, in my view, but could be supported by the United States in those military areas where we have unique capabilities. Such a residual force can be a United Nations peacekeeping force or a coalition of forces from European and other nations that are committed to seeing the building process continued. This will in most likelihood take a number of years. The point is that the planning for a residual force needs to commence as soon as possible.

Finally, as a necessary contingency, the United States should begin to work with our allies to ensure continuing cooperation to contain the conflict if the peace process breaks down, either while our troops are there or after we leave in about a year. NATO's vital interests in my view have never been involved in Bosnia itself—important interests, but not vital. But NATO's vital interests could certainly be involved if there is a spread of this conflict. Strategic planning within NATO must begin now for a long-term containment strategy if that breakdown occurs.

Mr. President, the United Nations deployment to Macedonia in which Unit-

ed States and Nordic forces are participating is a first step, only a first step but at least a first step, toward this broader containment strategy which may be essential in the long run.

Mr. President, I thank my colleagues for their attention, and I thank the Chair for the time. I would at this point yield the floor.

I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

TRIBUTE TO TOM PETTIT

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, I want to take a moment to pay tribute to a friend and a former NBC correspondent, Tom Pettit, who passed away today in New York. For more than a generation, Tom gave millions of viewers a front-row seat to a world of news and politics. As NBC news vice president Bill Wheatley noted:

His work was always distinctive: There was never any doubt that it was a Tom Pettit report. Truly, he was among the very best in the profession that he so loved.

Having interviewed every President since Harry Truman, Tom certainly earned his stripes in broadcast journalism. He preserved many moments of history, including the tragic assassination of President John F. Kennedy in Dallas. I know I speak for all of my colleagues in sending our thoughts and prayers to his wife, Patricia, and his children: Debra, Anne, James, and Robert.

JOINT STATEMENT

Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, just for the information of my colleagues, following the meeting today at the White House, we issued a joint statement. I will just read the joint statement.

We have agreed that we will issue statements from now on so we do not have any problem about somebody saying something that might be misinterpreted. And the joint statement reads:

Today we had good meetings which built on the progress made in yesterday's discussions. Staff will prepare further analysis to clarify options for the budget advisory group, which will then advise the principals on outstanding issues. Following the meeting of the budget advisory group, the principals will meet again next Friday afternoon.

So there will be a meeting with the President and the Vice President, the chief of staff, Leon Panetta, and the leaders of the House and the Senate.

On Thursday of next week and Wednesday of next week, staff and the advisory committees will meet.

So without much elaboration, I will say, in my view, we had a good session, very positive. I felt people wanted to get something done.